XNT short-address predicate and serialization check
2026-09-12. Companion to the source assessment.
XNT revision: cc8e8704026c916d545f02aa4d03b5693b6a58dd (v0.2.7).
The executable copies the released byte-to-field encoding and hash-lock instruction sequence, using the selected Triton 7.0.0 and twenty-first 1.1.0 dependencies. It supplies three synthetic public byte strings, derives the same preimages/postimages as the inspected short-address constructor, and checks VM acceptance against three incorrect witnesses. The strings need not be valid CTIDH curves: the tested predicate only consumes their derived hashes. The source assessment establishes how the released address code feeds that predicate. This isolates the spending relation; it is not a full transaction, valid-curve generation, STARK proof, network exploit or CTIDH cryptanalysis.
The same executable measures the serialized Generation address field layout, KEM public key and ciphertext sizes, and the short-address bech32m encodings. It does not build the complete XNT node or exercise the mobile app.
From this directory:
Recorded output: three public-derived witnesses accepted, three wrong witnesses rejected; Generation payload 2,168 B / 3,482 characters; short payload 64 B / 116 characters; short subaddress 72 B / 130 characters. All data are synthetic. The committed lockfile fixes the dependency resolution.
Source attribution: the byte encoder and lock instruction sequence are adapted from XNT's common.rs and lock_script.rs. The surrounding synthetic executable was added for this audit. The upstream Apache-2.0 license is included.